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In 2009 and 2010, following the controversial re-election as president of the incumbent 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad amidst claims of electoral fraud
i
, Iran witnessed the largest 
demonstrations since the 1979 Revolution. For some, the protest simply signified a desire for 
their vote for presidential candidates Mir-Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karoubi and Mohsen 
Rezai to be recognised, under the banner of ‘Where is my vote?’ For others, the popular 
uprisings were an expression of the desire for political change in the form of democratic 
practices within the context of the Islamic Republic, or a form of secular and/or democratic 
politics without the Islamic Republic. The uprisings were not restricted to the months 
immediately following the re-election of Ahmadinejad in June 2009 but developed into 2010, 
often referred to by those who participated in the protests and activists as the real annus 
horribilis. In fact, after the Ashura Day protest on 27 December 2009, activists were targeted 
with greater violence.  
These popular uprisings, and those who were involved in them, are now generally 
associated with what has come to be called the Green Movement, or Jibhih-yi Sabz. This is a 
label, along with associated names Mawj-i Sabz (Green Wave) and Rah-i Sabz (Green Path) 
that emerged from Mousavi’s presidential campaign, that has been given to what was 
essentially Iran’s democracy movement as well as to Mousavi’s and Karoubi’s supporters 
both before and after the election. The term is also used to refer to activists involved in the 
2010 uprisings. Thus, the ‘Green Movement’ has grown to represent the grievances of a 
significant portion of the population, convinced that Ahmadinejad’s re-election was flawed 
and calling for varied levels of political change.  
Mousavi and Karoubi are often considered as the Green Movement’s leaders. This has 
more to do with their association with the movement in 2009 rather a leading role in Iran’s 
broader democracy movement pre-2009. Apart from being Ahmadinejad’s competitors in the 
2009 election, both Mousavi and Karoubi are well-known politicians that, since the inception 
of the Islamic Republic, were aligned with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini who established the 
Islamic Republic. Both were among the founders of the Majma‘-i Rawhaniyyun-i Mubariz 
(Association of Combatant Clerics), the major faction of the Islamic Left, in 1988. Mousavi 
was prime minister between 1981 and 1989 after which he maintained a rather low political 
profile. Karoubi on the other hand, remained active. He was chairman of the parliament 
between 1989 and 1992, and 2000 and 2004; he founded his own party, Etemad-e Melli 
(National Trust) in 2005, and took part in the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections. Despite 
their diverging biographies, they both became part of the Reform Movement, which emerged 
in late 1990s, and is often referred to as ‘Khatamism’ after former reformist President 
Mohammad Khatami.  
Central to Khatamism is the concept of mardumsalari-yi Islami (Islamic democracy). 
However, the political demands of the protesters, many of whom are now in exile because of 
their activities during the uprisings, vary from Khatamism to ideas of dimukrasi-yi libiral 
(liberal democracy) and the rejection of the Islamic Republic, in addition to other ideas of 
secular politics. Thus, rather than referring to protesters only as the Green Movement, it is 
more appropriate to consider them in terms of protesters involved in the popular uprisings 
and, consequently, as bearers of diversified ideas in terms of political identity. Not all of 
those participating in the protests were activists involved in campaigns before 2009. Many 
publicly expressed their grievances during 2009-10 uprisings for the first time, or decided to 
join electoral committees in 2008 to counter Ahmadinejad’s candidature. In this sense, the 
presidential election and subsequent protests represented an extraordinary opening up of the 
structure of opportunity, broadening the possibility for political participation. 
While accepting that political identity is a contested concept, here Charles Tilly’s 
understanding of it in the context of contentious politics is helpful. Tilly argues that ‘Seen as 
social relations and their representations, all identities have a political side, actual or 
potential’ (Tilly 2005, 61). Thus, ‘identities are explicitly political’ when people make public 
claims based on a particular identity and/or ideology and in turn when governments are either 
the object of that claim or a third party to that claim (Tilly 2005, 62). Consequently, as Tilly 
argues, ‘Identities are political, then, insofar as they involve relations to governments’ (Tilly 
2005, 62). In relation to this case study, the 2009-10 uprisings represent a situation whereby a 
particular government identity (the Islamic Republic as constructed by Ahmadinejad and 
Khamenei) is being resisted. In reaction to this government identity, alternative claims 
regarding the nature of the government and how it should be represented and constructed are 
being made, as will be discussed below. 
This chapter brings together two approaches to these popular uprisings. The first takes 
a ‘top-down’ approach deconstructing the Green Movement’s political and intellectual elite 
discourses. The idea of elite in this context is complex. On the one hand, there are individuals 
who are part of the Islamic Republic regime as noted above. However, Mousavi and Karoubi 
have found themselves in opposition to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad because of how they perceive the Islamic Republic. This dynamic highlights a 
conflict among Iran’s political elite. However, in addition to this, Mousavi and Karoubi also 
take on the role of an intellectual and political elite in the context of the Green Movement. 
This is because of their role in defining and articulating what it means to be part of the Green 
Movement, even if they fail to be ‘leaders’ of the movement.   
The second approach takes a ‘bottom-up’ perspective focusing on activists (those 
involved in the uprisings that have a political background preceding 2009, or who are 
perceived by the regime as political) and participants in the protests. This highlights the 
heterogeneity of articulations of political identity amongst those who participated in the 
protests even if not all of them necessarily see themselves as part of the Green Movement, 
which is considered by some to be too narrowly linked to Mousavi’s campaign. The analysis 
unveils the complexity and fluidity of identity construction because of the co-existence of 
several, at times conflicting, political identities. Such an approach allows for a more holistic 
analysis of the popular uprisings and contributes to an understanding of why political change 
did not take place.  
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of the ‘national-popular collective will’ is a useful 
framework for understanding the conditions under which political change and/or revolution 
take place. For Gramsci, if revolution is to take place three elements are needed: a ‘modern 
prince’ in the form of a political party, an alliance including the masses, and an intellectual, 
cultural and moral reform of the masses. Together, these constitute the ‘national-popular 
collective will.’ A revolution whereby the existing hegemonic group is overturned in order to 
establish a new hegemon in the state only takes place if there is a ‘national-popular collective 
will’ (Gramsci 1971b, 125-205). Drawing on Gramsci’s ‘national-popular collective will’, we 
put forward that political identity heterogeneity, both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’, suggests 
that not only is the Islamic Republic’s position as the beholder of the ‘national-popular 
collective will’ under pressure, but also alludes to the lack of an alternative ‘national-popular 
collective will’ that would facilitate political change. Indeed, revolution was not necessarily 
the aim of those involved. Rather it was political change to varying degrees that was desired. 
It is important to remember that in 1979, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was 
overthrown. Those involved in the popular uprisings leading up to the 1979 revolution had 
varied and often contradicting political identities and aspirations. However, it was one 
political ideology that ultimately facilitated the revolution and the establishment of an 
alternative regime, namely the ‘religious nationalism’ of Khomeini (Ansari 2007). Thus, it 
can be argued that it was religious nationalism that facilitated the ‘intellectual, cultural and 
moral reform’ of the masses, and essentially involved them in a shared project with the 
revolutionary elites while underpinning the ‘national-popular collective will’; and Khomeini 
was the ‘modern prince’ (Holliday 2015).  
For those participating in the 2009-10 uprisings, a coherent political identity that 
ultimately facilitated consistency and unity of action did not exist. Nor was there an 
alternative unifying political ideology, or opportunity for a shared project to underpin the 
desire for change and facilitate the intellectual and cultural and reform. This is despite the 
evident opposition to the Islamic Republic as constructed by Ahmadinejad and Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Despite the prominence of Mousavi and Karoubi in terms of 
statements about the nature of the Green Movement and its demands, they essentially failed 
to become leaders of the protest movement. Consequently, there was not a modern prince 
character to bring together the subaltern masses under the banner of a unifying political 
identity and beyond class cleavages. Therefore, there was no alternative ‘national-popular 
collective will’ to facilitate political change.  
The first part of the chapter examines the discursive construction of the Islamic 
Republic as the true representative of Islam and as inherently democratic. Discourse is the 
means by which ideology, that is, a set of values, is transferred, articulated or communicated. 
In other words, ideology becomes evident in discourse (van Dijk 1998, 14, 192, 103; 
Fairclough 2001, 64). Discourse is both a means of maintaining power as well as resisting it. 
To this end, Michel Foucault argues that ‘Discourse transmits and produces power; it 
reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it’ (Foucault 1978, 100-1). Indeed, as is explored by David Howarth, ‘discourse 
always requires a discursive “outside” to constitute itself. The identity of a discourse, 
therefore, is dependent on differentiation from other discourses’ (Howarth 2000, 102). Thus, 
discourse can be both hegemonic as well as counter-hegemonic. Here, it will be shown that 
the Islamist democratic discourse of Mousavi and Karoubi is one that is counter-hegemonic 
in relation to the perceived hegemony of the discourse articulated by Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad. The identity of the Islamist democratic discourse is evident on the repeated 
differentiation of their understanding of the Islamic Republic from that of Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad.  
This section also illustrates the complexity of political identity among the elites. 
Accepting that Mousavi and Karoubi are the representatives of the Green Movement, it is 
worth highlighting that support for them has also come from individuals such as Abdolkarim 
Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, and Akbar Ganji. Formerly part of the Islamic Republic’s political 
elite, these individuals were part of the Reform movement, and have more recently 
articulated a secular political identity discourse. This political identity diversity mirrors the 
complexity of the elites. However, despite there being elites, the movement is considered to 
be leaderless.  
Existing alongside these elite discourses of political identity, are the political 
aspirations of activists and protesters participating in the uprisings. This is the focus of the 
second part of the chapter. For these activists there is not a neat clearly articulated discourse 
or political identity; rather, they articulate a number of political identities that sometimes 
complement those of the political elite, but also contradict them. This section rests on data 
collected during fieldwork and ethnographic research between 2009 and 2014 with Iranian 
asylum-seekers and political refugees in Turkey and Italy, which was preceded by fieldwork 
in Iran on civil society activism. The multi-sited field research allowed for an appreciation of 
the diversity present in the community of the activists. Apart from semi-structured 
interviews,
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 participant observation was carried out since many activists shared their 
everyday life for long periods.  
The issue of whether being outside of Iran has influenced the activists and protesters’ 
accounts needs to be addressed. Cross-verification helped contain potential issues arising 
from flawed information and the purpose of the research was always clearly stated in order to 
clarify the researcher’s role. It is noteworthy that the social class background of these 
protesters and activists is similar. The individuals interviewed belong to the middle class, 
albeit of diversified types (nuances of lower and upper middle class). This is in line with 
extant scholarship highlighting the relevance of the middle class to Iran’s domestic politics 
and the uprisings (Harris 2012, Behdad and Nomani 2009). Finally, the age of activists and 
participants in the uprisings is also notable as they all are in their late 20s to late 30s. This 
resonates with the overall association of the protests with mainly young people. 
Political Elites: Top-down Heterogeneity and the Battle over the Islamic Republic 
To consider Mousavi and Karoubi, or the Green Movement, in isolation limits the 
understanding of the uprisings. The Islamist democratic discourse of Mousavi and Karoubi 
reflects the reformism of Khatami’s presidency (1997-2005) and the ideas of Rawshanfikran-
i Dini (Religious Intellectuals) of the late 1980s and 1990s. In other words, it is the latest 
phase in Khatamism. As illustrated below, some activists, while working within the 
institutions of Khatamism, see Khatamism as the obstacle to political change. Thus, it is 
crucial to address this genealogy. 
In terms of political identity and aspiration for the nature of government, it is 
Khatami’s mardumsalari-yi Islami that can be considered the basic ideology. This is 
‘government for the people’, integral to which are the rule of law and freedom and equality of 
citizens; and is to be achieved through civil society and upheld by the Islamic Republic’s 
Constitution (Holliday 2011, 114-21; Khatami 1377/1998, 18)
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. This idea of the 
compatibility of Islam and democracy is part of a wider movement; a post-Islamist movement 
whereby Muslims made Islam democratic (Bayat 2007). In Iran’s case, while this idea was 
advocated at the state level for the first time during Khatami’s presidency, its roots are in the 
Reform Movement of Rawshanfikran-i Dini, who, in the early 1990s, engaged in a critique of 
the Islamic Republic and the role of vilayat-i faqih (Dabashi 2006, 190). Vilayat-i faqih is the 
principle of the guardianship of the jurist, which legitimates the clerical rule and the office of 
the Supreme Leader. This principle, along with the khat-i imam (line of the Imam), are 
considered to be the foundation of the Islamic Republic. Among Rawshanfikran-i Dini, was 
the lay intellectual Soroush, from whom Khatami’s ideas and language regarding 
‘democracy’ and ‘rule of law’ are said to be mostly taken (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper 2006, 
29). While Soroush rejected Islam as a political ideology, the cleric Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari 
argued that ‘not only are Islam and democracy in the realm of state and government not 
incompatible, but, on the contrary, Muslim government cannot be undemocratic’ (Mir-
Hosseini and Tapper 2006, 86).  
Also, among these intellectuals was the cleric Kadivar, who advocated ‘power 
sharing, independent grassroots associations, political parties, the rule of law, and individual 
rights and freedom’ as supporters of jami‘ih-i madani (civil society) (Kadivar 1997 cited in 
Moslem 2002: 252). However, unlike Khatami, he rejected the idea of vilayat-i faqih and 
equated it with monarchy (Mir-Hosseini and Tapper 2006, 35–6). For Kadivar, democracy 
includes ‘free and all-inclusive elections’; ‘transparent and accountable government’ and 
respect for ‘civil and political rights’ (Kadivar 2015). Vilayat-i faqih is also rejected by Ganji, 
a journalist, an important individual in Iran’s democracy movement and among 
Rawshanfikran-i Dini. For Ganji, a ‘modern democratic republic’, where ‘All adult citizens 
have the right to participate in elections’ and where no individual can be prohibited from 
participation because of their beliefs, religion or race (Ganji 1381/2002), cannot be realised 
within the framework of vilayat-i faqih (Ganji 1379/2000). It is important to highlight these 
ideas and individuals. Kadivar, Ganji and Soroush had been among the Islamic Republic’s 
founders. They then came to reject its foundation, vilayat-i faqih. However, in 2010 they 
pledged their support for Karoubi, Mousavi and Khatami, who do not reject vilayat-i faqih 
(NPQ 2010). Despite their rejection of vilayat-i faqih, they are part of ‘Khatamism’ because 
they are themselves products of the Islamic Republic, as indeed are Mousavi and Karoubi.  
These apparent paradoxes of political identity among Iran’s political and intellectual elites are 
symptomatic of the factionalised nature of the Islamic Republic. This has often been 
characterised as a ‘balkanised’ or ‘factionalised authoritarianism’, whereby elite 
fragmentation within state institutions is crucial to the maintenance of institutional balance 
(Keshavarzian 2005, Chehabi 2001, Moslem 2002, Buchta 2000, Kamrava and Yari 2004). 
Such a decentralization of power has thus been a guarantee of regime resilience, in contrast 
with, for instance, the centralization of power present in Zine el-Abidine’s Tunisia or Hosni 
Mubarak’s Egypt (Hinnebusch 2015). Along with elite factionalism, state institutions are also 
fragmented and ‘taken over’ by competing factions. This ‘institutional balkanization’ has 
enabled the regime to reproduce its power and remain in balance, while this pluralist, albeit 
limited, and decentralised elite system has historically allowed for internal ideological 
diversity within the political and economic elite. 
The internal ideological diversity of Islamic Republic elites came to a head in the 
2009-10 popular uprisings. Through a discourse analysis of Mousavi’s and Karoubi’s texts it 
is clear there is a battle over vilayat-i faqih and the nature of the Islamic Republic. This is 
illustrated in the binary relationship constructed between the ‘self’ (Green Movement) and 
the ‘other’ (Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their supporters). It is evident that embedded in 
Mousavi’s and Karoubi’s Islamist democratic discourse, is the construction of the ‘self’ as 
inclusive and egalitarian, democratic, peaceful, true Islam, and as the rightful followers of 
Shi’ism’s first Imam, Hussein. The hegemonic ‘other’, on the other hand, is constructed as 
totalitarian, tyrannical, violent and essentially un-Islamic. For Mousavi and Karoubi, these 
characteristics are attributed to the ‘other’ because of their role in the arrest, imprisonment, 
and in some instances killing of activists involved in the uprisings.  
The binary relationship of the inclusive, egalitarian and peaceful ‘self’ versus the 
tyrannical and violent ‘other’ is evident in the statements made after the uprisings following 
the June election. For instance, towards the beginning of the ‘11th Statement: The Green Path 
of Hope’, made on 5 September 2009, Mousavi criticises Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their 
supporters by describing their actions as ‘attacks carried out by official and unofficial 
security forces on peaceful demonstrations’. Mousavi goes on to state that ‘the only way for 
the peaceful coexistence of tastes and attitudes, social layers, tribes, religions and beliefs that 
live in this great land, is to acknowledge this vast diversity in lifestyles and to gather around 
an ancient identity which links all of us.’ (Mousavi 2009a) The ‘17th Statement: “Killing us 
will only make us stronger”’, issued on January 2, 2010 reiterates this binary relationship. 
Mousavi describes the people who went to the streets without requests to do so from 
Mousavi, Karoubi or Khatami as going ‘non-violently, without any radical slogans’. 
However, ‘yet again, the people were provoked. This time around, they were faced with 
unspeakable violence: people were run over; they came under open fire from plainclothes 
police, whose identity (as well as the identity of their leaders) is now known to everyone’ 
(Mousavi 2010b). He later ties the ‘self’ directly to the 1979 Revolution by invoking 
Khomeini. To this end, he states: ‘The kind of talk mentioned above reminds me of the words 
of the great Imam [Khomeini]: “Killing us will only make us stronger.” I am not afraid to be 
among those who have been martyred for expressing their religious and patriotic rights after 
the election’ (Mousavi 2010b). This invocation legitimises the peaceful self’ and 
delegitimises the violent ‘other’. 
The peaceful ‘self’ is further legitimised by associating it with democratic values. In 
the ‘11th Statement’, Mousavi states that ‘A restoration of public trust is not possible without 
the acceptance of the right of the people to govern themselves, without obtaining their final 
approval of their ruling system, and without transparency in the affairs of the state’ (Mousavi 
2009a). These sentiments are echoed in Mousavi’s 18th Statement, which explicitly outlines 
‘The Green Movement’s Values’ and makes the human rights discourse explicit. Mousavi 
argues that the Green Movement ‘fully endorses’ human rights and the ‘the defence of human 
dignity’, which is independent of ideology, religion, gender, ethnicity, and social status’ 
(Mousavi 1389/2010, 2010a). For Mousavi, the defence of human rights is to be realised 
through a free independent press, an end to censorship, the strengthening of civil society and 
allowing non-governmental organizations to act freely, and perhaps most significantly, 
reforming ‘laws and regulations to eliminate any type of discrimination in society’ (Mousavi 
1389/2010, 2010a).  
The real resistance to what is constructed as the hegemonic violent and tyrannical 
discourse of Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their supporters is embedded in the binary 
construction of the ‘self’ as the true representatives of Islam and the ‘other’ as un-Islamic. 
This is articulated in a number of ways. The first is in the democratic nature of Islam. The 
way that the relationship between Islam and democracy is constructed delegitimises 
Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their construction of the Islamic Republic because Mousavi and 
Karoubi repeatedly show how values associated with democracy are at the core of the Islamic 
Republic’s constitution. For instance, Mousavi states that practices such as the provision of 
political and social rights, legal immunity and equality before the law, freedom of the press, 
freedom of political parties and people and the freedom to hold peaceful gatherings all have 
specific articles dedicated to them in the Islamic Republic’s constitution (Mousavi 2009a). 
Mousavi goes on state that ‘the Islamic Republic or the constitution is Islam itself’ (Mousavi 
2009a). He also states that when Khomeini juxtaposed ‘pure mohammadian Islam’ with ‘the 
archaic Islam and American Islam, he was speaking of what is going on now [official 
responses to the protestors]. This backward interpretation might be named “Islam”, but is far 
from the real Islam. We want a return to the pure mohammadian Islam, this long, forgotten 
religion.’ (Mousavi 2009a) He also refers to the use of the colour green to symbolise the 
devotion of the Green Movement to ‘an Islam that had the kin of the prophet as its first 
educators’ (Mousavi 2009a).  
A similar tone is articulated by Karoubi. In a statement made on June 20, 2010 to 
commemorate the anniversary of the Green Movement, Karoubi raises a series of questions 
regarding the conduct of the Islamic Republic and the institution of vilayat-i faqih. He asks 
how ‘Vilayat-i faqih can take an axe to the roots of the Constitution and the Islamic Republic 
that were founded on the people’s vote?’ This is followed by a question asking why the 
authority of vilayat-i faqih has been extended to such an extent beyond that which Karoubi 
doubts was given to the Prophets or the infallible Imams. Finally, he asks how votes are in 
opposition to Islam or vilayat-i faqih and how the demand for rights can be considered a 
crime against vilayat-i faqih when ‘in Islam, a dissident can debate with an infallible Imam 
even regarding the existence of God’ (Karoubi 1389/2010, 2010). Here, Karoubi associates 
the Green Movement with the original ideals of the 1979 Revolution and constructs vilayat-i 
faqih as inherently democratic. The Supreme Leader’s version, however, is not. 
Not only do Mousavi and Karoubi construct the Green Movement as the true and 
proper Islamic Republic, but also as the true and proper representation of Islam as a whole. 
This is done by establishing plurality and diversity as part of Islam by arguing these values 
were the path of ‘divine prophets and their predecessors’ in the ‘great, ancient and pious 
family which is Iran’ (Mousavi 1388/2009, 2009b). He then argues that throughout history 
‘whenever governments have aimed to abolish or dim the plurality and diversity that exists in 
society, they’ve had no choice but to resort to tyranny’. He significantly ends this particular 
section by arguing that such behaviour ‘is both impossible and inappropriate, according to the 
teachings of the Qur’an’ (Mousavi 1388/2009, 2009b). This discourse subtly constructs 
Khamenei’s Islamic Republic as un-Islamic. 
This powerful Islamic/un-Islamic binary construction is also articulated by 
establishing the Green Movement as the true representatives of Shi’ism. This is particularly 
evident in Mousavi’s ‘17th Statement: “Killing us will only make us stronger”’ issued shortly 
after the Ashura protests in December 2009-January 2010. It is here that he establishes the 
Green Path as the true followers of the martyred Imam Hussein. Ashura is an important day 
in the Iranian calendar as it commemorates the death of Imam Hussein, Shi’ism’s holiest 
martyr. Reportedly, these protests were the largest since those that immediately followed the 
election and bore witness to violence whereby protestors clashed with security forces and 
several protestors were reportedly killed and arrested (Worth and Fathi 2009; Tait 2009a, 
2009b; Telegraph 2009). Video footage of the protests shows that, unlike the June 2009 
protests, protestors did not carry posters illustrating slogans. However, chanted slogans 
included those referring to Khamenei as Yazid (WashingtonTV 2009), the Umayyad Caliph 
whose army was responsible for the death of Hussein at the Battle of Karbala. Imam Hussein, 
the Prophet Muhammad’s nephew and Imam Ali’s (the holiest Imam in Shi’ism) son refused 
to swear allegiance to Yazid because he was believed to be unjust. Mousavi delegitimises 
Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and their supporters by constructing the ‘self’ as the rightful 
followers of Shi’ism’s Imam, Hussein:  
... I feel a burden of necessity to emphasize the Islamic and national identity of the 
green movement, its opposition to foreign rule, and its loyalty to our constitution. We 
are the followers of Imam Hossein. We are the devotees of the path that was led by 
that oppressed Imam. ... We are the followers of the first Imam of the Shi’ites, who 
could not tolerate taking something valuable from even one member of a minority in 
the vast Islamic nation. (Mousavi 2010b) 
The 2009-10 popular uprisings reveal a battle over what should be the legitimate identity of 
Iran’s political system. The 2009 election took place in the context of a regime with a 
particular political identity: the Islamic Republic as constructed by Khamenei and 
Ahmadinejad, which is constructed as tyrannical, violent and un-Islamic by the Green 
Movement political elite. This is contested by an alternative understanding of the Islamic 
Republic which is constructed as peaceful, democratic and as truly Islamic. This political 
identity is articulated through the Islamist democratic discourse of Khatamism. A crucial 
element of this discourse is the importance of human rights that comes across in the 
democratic aspirations of the elites whether in favour of the Islamic Republic or rejecting the 
basis of the Islamic Republic. However, despite the relevance of broad and shared values 
such as human rights, these elites are also strongly criticised, or even lack legitimacy in some 
cases, as they are the product of the very Islamic Republic they are opposing.  
Activists and Protesters: Bottom-up Heterogeneity 
The Green Movement and the 2009-10 uprisings have benefitted from both electoral 
mobilisation and the legacy of extant informal activist networks and social movements 
among which, notably, are women, ethnic and religious minorities and student movements 
(Adelkhah 2012, Reisinezhad 2015). It is no coincidence that women’s rights or the 
grievances and demands from ethnic minorities, which had been barely present in previous 
electoral campaigns, prominently featured in Mousavi and Karoubi’s electoral program in 
2009. This was the result of previous mobilisation and the attention that, since early-2000s, 
these issues have received.
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 Such broad genealogy has enriched the 2009-10 movement, 
which has expanded its composition and demands also thanks to its life span, going well 
beyond the electoral moment and showing support for Mousavi and Karoubi. Such 
heterogeneity is well evidenced in the accounts of the activists and those who took part in the 
protests, who are from diverse backgrounds ranging from reformists’ supporters to critics of 
the very existence of the Islamic Republic.  
However, despite such varied backgrounds, activists and/or protesters also share some 
common themes. One of these is the belief that the Green Movement and the 2010 uprisings 
are connected to Khatamism and the Reform Movement, and even before to Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s post-war technocratic modernization plan during the 1990s. Although the 
Islamic Left fiercely opposed Rafsanjani’s administrations (1989-1997), Khatamism and the 
Reform Movement partially recovered its legacy in terms of pragmatism and moderation. In 
fact, most of the respondents place their own political history within this political trajectory, 
for both autobiographical and ideological reasons. Zia, a journalist with connections to the 
main reformist political party Jibhih-yi Musharikat and the less influential reformist party 
Hambastegi,
v
 declares that ‘the project of the reformists [during Khatami’s administration] 
has been the one of political development and change, …Khatami was following Rafsanjani’s 
project, the reformists should have realised that project.’ He goes on to explain his view on 
the origin of the Reform Movement, which he dates back to the end of Rafsanjani’s era:  
The parliamentary election of 1996 showed that Rafsanjani’s views were not 
welcome in society any more. So they decided to set up a party and participate 
in the 1997 presidential election with a governmental proposal [that was] 
different [from Rafsanjani’s political outline and] that could have advanced the 
people’s interests. They established an activist party” (Zia 2012). 
Kaveh, who formerly worked for a publishing house connected to the Tehran branch of Azad 
University, was involved in a number of initiatives related to Mousavi’s electoral campaigns 
and later in initiatives in support of political prisoners. He highlights how Khatami’s role had 
been crucial in setting up the electoral campaign of Mousavi.  
The electoral staff and committees were formed one year before the election, 
and they had the objective of reinforcing their presence among the people to 
boost political activism at large, since the people were very de-mobilised and 
had a cold heart after Ahmadinejad’s administration […] The website Mawj-i 
Sivum organised a series of activities and invited Khatami to become a 
candidate, but he refused. So, Mousavi inherited all this apparatus of people 
that previously worked for Khatami […] even if many younger activists were 
not very convinced by Mousavi (Kaveh 2012).” 
The link with Khatamism and the reform movement, however, does not prevent activists 
from advancing strong criticism of that project. In particular, the activists met during 
fieldwork seemed to be well aware of the limitation that being active in the Green Movement 
and in Mousavi’s or Karoubi’s electoral committees presented. In fact, the dominant feeling 
among them was that political expression and activism are confined to the regime’s structures 
and that there are no alternative avenues for influencing the political elite. No naïvety is thus 
present among the activists, who are well aware of the ideological and political limitations 
they are doomed to cope with.  
It follows that one critique of Khatamism and the Green Movement is that it is 
confined within the political ideology of the Islamic Republic. Majid (2012), who was 
involved in unionism in Iran, is realistic about the actual possibility for change in the country 
and he suggests the existence of islahtalaban-i khalis (complete reformists) to counter 
islahtalaban-i hukumati (government reformists). The latter is an expression that refers to 
those reformists whose political project falls within the limitation set by the constitution, such 
as the Green Movement’s political elite outlined above. Islahtalaban-i khalis, on the other 
hand, are seen as those who seek real change from below and beyond the limits of the Islamic 
Republic. It is the ‘complete reformists’ who are paying for their political activism.vi  
A similar criticism is voiced by Amir. He comes from a political family close to the Nihzat-i 
Azadi, or Freedom Movement, a semi-legal political organisation whose main ideology can 
be described as religious-nationalist. Despite this affiliation, he defines himself as ‘kamilan 
mukhalif (totally against) the Islamic Republic’. He argues that ‘mardum (the people) were 
hopeful that Mousavi could come and fix the system’. However, as far as Amir is concerned, 
this would ‘be impossible because the system is not what Mousavi and Karoubi are saying it 
is; the system is what Ahmadinejad says it is.’ He continues criticising Khatami: ‘Khatami 
got many votes because he said he was in favour of the people but it was not true… Khatami 
killed [people in] the movement, so many got arrested and killed. He [his political credibility] 
was killed on 18 Tir 1388/9 July 2009 (Amir 2011).’ On that day, a major demonstration was 
called to celebrate both the discontent with the results of the presidential election and the 
tenth anniversary of the student protests of 1999, which resulted in sustained disorder and 
violence in the capital and in other cities.
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 In 1999, the students supported Khatami’s reform 
plan while he did not defend them from the repression that followed the disorders. Back then, 
this event marked the beginning of the distancing of the student movement from Khatamism, 
and Amir evokes it to reiterate that Khatami’s political credibility, in his eyes, has not been 
restored. Saber, a Kurdish asylum-seeker, involved in a campaign of support to Kurdish 
political prisoners in Iran, also criticises Mousavi and Karoubi’s political project, which he 
distinguishes from the Green Movement: ‘for all the people of Iran, it is clear that the green 
movement was a genuine movement but … the people know that its leadership [Mousavi and 
Karoubi] wasn’t so … because they are khat-i imam ’. He goes on to state that ‘If Mousavi or 
Karoubi became president, they would not have been any better than Rouhani or Khatami or 
Ahmadinejad… they are all together, and the system is one: vilayat-i faqih and khat-i imam 
(Saber 2014).’ Saber’s analysis is significant because it suggests that those who are loyal to 
khat-i imam and vilayat-i faqih, and therefore Khomeinists, are not genuinely part of the 
people’s Green Movement. 
Khatamism is also critiqued for its limited scope in terms of political aspirations for 
change, which does not reach out the protesters’ desire for ‘democracy’. While the details of 
‘democracy’ are not necessarily fully articulated, protesters and activists refer to ‘democracy’ 
as their political aim. However, here the term dimukrasi is used rather than the mardumsalari 
of Khatami, thus distancing them from Khatamism. Zia (2012), for instance, argues that 
‘Khatami worked very little for dimukrasi and for the development of the people and society 
… [he] did a lot for the national economy and for the development of the government itself.’ 
Zia goes on arguing that not only had reformists brought about an elitist version of 
reformism, but also that ‘they were rigid in pointing out the path to reform and the objective 
that should be obtained’. For Zia, the rigidity of the reformists is evident in the 
marginalisation of social movements. Another interviewee, Ali (2011), a writer who does not 
consider himself ‘political’, is explicit about his desire for ‘nizam-i dimukrasi-yi libiral’ 
(democratic liberal system). For him, the freedom of press is very important. As far as he is 
concerned, the ‘rights of the people of Iran’, ‘freedom of press’, a ‘junbish-i madani’ (civic 
movement) and ‘the rule of law’ are not possible in an Islamic Republic. Farzaneh (2011), a 
former NGO worker from Tehran, is also in favour of a ‘more democratic state’. This was her 
rationale for participating in the 2010 uprisings. She states that she is an NGO worker, 
targeted by the nizam (regime), but she was not part of Karoubi or Mousavi’s electoral 
structure. 
The existence of a unifying, albeit very vague, political aspiration, democracy, does 
not disempower differences and conflicts within the movement. Reza (2012), a former 
student activist banned from university because of his political activities, refers to Mojtaba 
Vahedi’s resignation from his position as Karoubi’s spokesperson in 2012, as evidence of the 
existence of different tendencies within the Green Movement.
viii
 Vahedi’s resignation was 
motivated by an ideological contraposition to Karoubi, who, as noted above, believes in 
returning to the original aims of the Islamic Republic and the constitutional principles 
sustaining it. Vahedi, however, is critical of that original, Khomeinist project despite the 
important role he played in Iran’s domestic politics and the Reform Movement during the 
1990s and 2000s. Reza describes the Green Movement as divided between two tendencies, 
namely the likes of Vahedi, who came to the conclusion that the regime is not changeable by 
the means of democratic reforms and that its constitutional underpinnings are problematic; 
and the likes of Mousavi and Karoubi, who have faith in vilayat-i faqih. Indeed as Sara 
(2012), a former student activist currently involved in a number of campaigns in the United 
States, points out, there are different political models Green activists aspire to, well beyond 
the one offered by the Islamic Republic, and liberal democracy is one of them. Ali (2011) for 
instance prefers it because ‘it favours peace’. Others, Sara explains, are in favour of liberal 
democracy because they perceive it to be in stark opposition to the Islamic Republic. 
These declarations highlight how the Green Movement has been inhabited by a diverse 
cohort of individuals and organisations. This is mirrored not only in the internal ideological 
diversity and the scepticism towards the leadership, but also in the structure of the movement 
which Kaveh (2012) links to its capability of surviving Mousavi and Karoubi’s arrests. Kaveh 
compares the Green Movement to an army, namely an apparently hierarchical organisation, 
but claims that the lower levels were independent from and more relevant than the 
commanders. The generals are Mousavi, Karoubi, and the high echelons of Jibhih-yi 
Musharikat; the afsar (mid-level officers) are activists, such as himself, and finally are the 
soldiers namely the ordinary people. Kaveh states:  
Two months after the election, the generals were jailed or arrested but the army 
was still at war. So, they [the security forces and conservatives in power] 
realised that the army, even with no generals, was still working and that the 
struggle was ongoing. So they reached the conclusion that they had to get rid of 
afsar as well … They realised afsar were even more important than generals, 
because afsar had the actual contacts with the people that took to the streets. 
Some of us [afsar] were already in politics, we had social capital we could 
build on the past … but we also were intellectually independent … we were in 
such a position that we could lead the movement and make decisions when the 
generals were jailed and not accessible anymore (Kaveh 2012). 
The relative independence of the movement from the elite is also highlighted by Zia, who 
declares that the inspiration model is ‘Poland, where the people established a movement and 
never stopped fighting and struggling through it.’ He goes on to state: ‘so the lesson we have 
to learn is that it is possible with the people’s will to change things’, regardless of the will of 
the leadership or political elites. 
Given this variety and the strong criticism against the reformist political elite, it is 
pertinent to ask why critics engaged with electoral politics at all. All interviewees point out 
that the 2009 presidential election was not like other elections; it was special. Kaveh (2012) 
explains that ‘we decided as a group to be active in the 2009 elections. The 2009 election was 
interesting because it was an important point in the political history of Iran.’ Sadegh (2010), a 
political refugee and former member of the student organisation Daftar-i Tahkim-i Vahdat, 
refers to the fact that ‘we wanted to chase out Ahmadinejad.’ This is in line with what 
Mohammad Maljoo (2010) argued, that the tenth presidential election became so topical 
because of the deep division present in Iran. At the elite level, the consolidation of 
Ahmadinejad’s power was to the detriment of the power of other circles but, apart from elite 
rivalry, the 2009 election became salient to Iranian citizens too, because of the state of 
electoral politics in the country. While the Iranian citizenry saw, since early 2000s, their 
electoral choice being narrowed down by the continuous disqualification of reformist 
candidates, the conservatives and hardliners showed little respect for the people’s electoral 
will. The notorious slogan ‘where is my vote’ resonates with this background, and the 
willingness to ‘chase out Ahmadinejad’ was the objective that kept a diversified, ‘unruly’ 
movement and the reformist political elite together, albeit with limitation.  
The pragmatism of engaging the ‘best option available’ even if it represents a ‘second 
best’ is well symbolised by Pouya (2010), a Marxist political refugee who was heavily 
involved in Karoubi’s campaign and the Mourning Mothers, a group of relatives of the 
victims of the 2009-10 and previous government repressions. Pouya expressed annoyance 
with the fact that the majority of the events organised in Italy about Iran was pivoted on the 
Green Movement, which was depicted as a coherent and non-diversified group of pro-
democracy liberals. While holding a very critical position on human rights and democracy, 
perceived as liberal constructs, he saw the Green Movement as the only opportunity to 
mobilise in Iran. Similarly Amir G. (2012), a monarchist asylum-seeker who took part in the 
protests, explains that for him the Green Movement was a breath of fresh air, since it gave 
him and fellow monarchists the opportunity to express their views in the street. Amir talks 
about how during the protests they carried the Shir va Khurshid (lion and sun) flag. Outlawed 
by the Islamic Republic, this was the Pahlavi regime’s flag which harked back to Iran’s 
antiquity and is used today by monarchists in opposition to the Islamic Republic. Amir then 
states that ‘no one said anything to us’ and they began to realise that ‘there were many of us 
among the protesters’.  
The expansion of the structure of opportunity that took place before the election, with 
the establishment of the electoral committees, convinced many activists from different walks 
of life to participate. Majid, active in trade unionism and workers’ campaigns, explains that 
he entered Mousavi’s electoral staff because he saw in the electoral machine the opportunity 
of raising the issue of unionism more forcefully. He stated that ‘It is very difficult to talk 
about trade unionism in Iran …. During the electoral campaign, candidates were somehow 
forced to look at labor-related issues … Mousavi talked about workers’ rights, and it was 
mainly propaganda, but I entered his committee to seize the opportunity of turning that 
propaganda into something real (Majid 2012).’ In addition, Kaveh (2012) highlights that, in a 
country like Iran, where there is a tendency of abusing activists, it is important to be ‘part of 
an organisation’ from which activists can get ‘protection.’ This non-convergent multitude of 
political aspirations, strategies and identities reflect the lack of a united political identity that 
can facilitate an alternative national-popular collective will.  
The complex organisation of the Green Movement, its ideological diversity, is also 
evidenced by the different takes that respondents have had on the issue of the movement’s 
leadership. This mirrors the lack of a Gramscian modern price that, in the form of a structured 
organisation or a group of individuals, could aggregate the different ideological and identity 
leanings with the purpose of promoting change. In fact, not only were Mousavi and Karoubi 
ideologically challenged by the activists, but they also are not regarded as the leaders of 
Iran’s opposition. When asked to define the opposition in Iran, Reza (2012) replies that ‘it 
[the opposition] is all activists.’ According to Saber (2014), the opposition does not have any 
leadership. He states that ‘we would need someone separated from akhund (the clergy), the 
Shah and all the likes … instead, the opposition flees from Iran, goes to Europe and 
reproduces old dynamics of lack of unity.’ Jamshid (2012), an asylum-seeker and former 
member of the outlawed Islamist-Marxist organisation Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)
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, is also 
very critical of Mousavi and Karoubi as leaders: ‘[they] called on the people to mobilise and 
the people followed them. But today they won’t do it again because they have lost faith in 
reformism.’  
As highlighted by Saber (2014), and interestingly enough, many among the 
respondents referred to the broad spectrum of the Iranian opposition, both inside and outside 
Iran, as the political landscape from which a leadership should be emerging. Amir G. (2012) 
would not count the reformists, namely Khatami, Mousavi or Karoubi, as being the 
representative of the opposition and the leaders of the movement: ‘reformists would not count 
as representatives, as they are hukumati, … they are powerful because have the money of the 
government.’ He mentions Jamileh Kadivar (Mohsen Kadivar’s sister, and editor of the 
website Rah-i Sabz, also known as Jaras, linked to Mousavi and the Green Movement) and 
Ata’ollah Mohajerani (former Minister of Culture during Khatami’s first government and 
Jamileh Kadivar’s husband) as examples of why reformists do not represent the concerns of 
the people. He states that ‘they have Rafsanjani’s money who, it is true, had a lot of problems 
since 1388/2009
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 but are still taraf-i Jumhuri-yi Islami (supporter of the regime) … but 
Rafsanjani’s problems are issues related to the structure of the regime and factions in power, 
not to the people.’ Amir G. concludes by stating that ‘sabzha-yi ghayr-i hukumati (non-
governmental Greens) are the most important group, because the Green Movement was a 
people’s movement, not a movement of the elite in power.’ Despite identifying diverse 
sources for potential leadership, there is agreement over the lack of coordination within the 
broad front of the opposition. Reza argues that  
there is a cultural problem … and conflicts are dictated by the lust for power … also 
the experience of the revolution of 1357/1979 … has impacted forcefully on 
collective memory and everyone is worried that we are going to experience the same 
pain with no leadership able to smoothen the revolutionary process. (Reza 2012) 
Conclusion 
The chapter has highlighted the complexity of what usually is called Green Movement by 
unveiling its fragmented composition, both at the elite and grassroots level. This 
heterogeneity has significant implications when it comes to the political identities present 
within the broad 2009-10 movement, which transcended the boundaries of electoral politics 
and went well beyond electoral support for the two reformist candidates, Mousavi and 
Karoubi. The resilience of mobilisations in 2009 and 2010 created the opportunity for more 
people and activists from diverse backgrounds to join the protests. This heterogeneous 
composition of the protesting crowd is also a characteristic of the political elite protesting the 
results of the 2009 election. Elites and the elite’s discourses on the protests have included 
diverse instances on crucial issues such as the relationship between religion and the state, the 
meaning of accountability and secularism. These multiple identities have not been absorbed 
by the presence of a modern prince, capable of dominating them with shared demands and 
making them hegemonic within society at large. Apart from the absence of a modern prince, 
class politics may also explain why the demands and positions of the 2009-10 movement did 
not reach hegemony in society. The reluctance of Mousavi and Karoubi to embrace the 
broader demands for change that emerged from early mobilizations has been a further 
obstacle to the establishment of hegemony within society. This reluctance seems to mirror a 
general caution towards political change that the activists had already noticed during 
Khatami’s governments, namely the fear of mobilisations that may potentially overwhelm the 
elites themselves, engendering unleashed, radical change. The 2009-10 uprisings ended with 
a forced return to normalcy by the means of repression, forced emigration, as many activists 
had to seek refuge abroad, and by the unwillingness of the political elite to walk the path of 
political change. In this respect, Khatami’s decision to vote in the 2012 Parliamentary 
election, in rupture with the extant debate about boycotting the vote, is quite symbolic and 
highlights the preference for continuity of this reformist elite (Dehghan 2012).  
The election of Hassan Rouhani as president in June 2013 and the partial reintegration 
of reformist policy-makers
xi
 seemed to mark the end of the protest cycle of 2009-10. 
However, it is relevant to point out the continued exclusion of more radical political identities 
and instances of change. In fact, while Rouhani’s election successfully re-included part of the 
reformist elite and electorate, it is important to remember that a significant part of the 
identities and demands for change highlighted in the chapter remain excluded from 
institutional representation and positions of power. This long-term exclusion might have 
future consequences that are beyond the scope of this chapter. Its presence might engender 
new cycles of contention in continuity with the 2009-10 and previous mobilisations, as it 
happened in the case of the Arab uprisings which have built during decades of discontent and 
overlooked scattered mobilisations.  
                                                 
i
 Mousavi, Karoubi and Rezai argued that there was evidence of electoral fraud (Ansari 2010, 
5). In this context reports were published putting forward this argument (Mebane 2009; 
Ehsani et al. 2009). 
ii
 In total, more than 60 in-depth interviews have been conducted by Paola Rivetti. However, 
only some have been used for this chapter. 
                                                                                                                                                        
iii
 The Gregorian calendar is not usually used in Iran. Therefore the Iranian publication date is 
given with the Gregorian equivalent. When a text is available in both Persian and English 
both references are given. 
iv
 Since the early 2000s, Daftar-i Tahkim-i Vahdat, one of Iran’s biggest student 
organisations, established commissions and sister organisations according to ethnicity. See 
also Nagah (2009). 
v
 Jibhih-yi Musharikat-i Iran-i Islami (Islamic Iran Participation Front), led by Mohammad 
Reza Khatami, the ex-president’s brother, is now outlawed.  
vi
 Among asylum-seekers and political refugees outside of Iran, the hierarchical structures 
that exist in the Islamic Republic, are reproduced. Government reformists usually get 
processed much more quickly than ‘ordinary’ asylum-seekers, who have fewer high profile 
political connections. It follows that pure reformists are willing and obliged to pay a higher 
price for their activism and, according to Majid, it is a marker of genuine political 
commitment. See Rivetti (2013). 
vii
 For a chronicle of that day, see Mackey (2009). See also Rivetti (2012). 
viii
 See Yazdanpanah (2012). Vahedi has been a crucial personality within the reform 
movement during the 1990s and 2000s and one of Karoubi’s closest collaborator since 1980s. 
He was editor of a well-known reformist newspaper, Aftab-e Yazd. 
ix
 Established before the revolution, MEK was marginalised by Khomeini and the clergy 
since 1979. It sided with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and carried out a number 
of bombings in Iran with the purpose of fighting against the Islamic Republic. 
x
 Rafsanjani mildly supported the protesters and, because of this, some members of his family 
faced arrest, restrictions of freedom of movement and other sanctions. 
xi
 This reintegration is quite evident in the case of governmental think tanks. The influential 
Institute for Political and International Studies, for instance, has been the theatre of intense 
factional conflicts and after 2013 the political analysts present in the pre-Ahmadinejad era 
have been re-installed.  
